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The Theory of Legal Science: A Review*
ERIC VOEGELINt

I

The number of contributions to a theory of legal science is so
small that every essay in the field can be assured of eager attention. The present monograph of Mr. Cairns can be assured of it
doubly because of the qualities of the author as well as of his
work. To give an adequate account of the compact book is, however, not an easy task. There are several circumstances which
baffle the reader; I shall report them first without comment, and
only afterwards venture on an evaluation of the problems presented by the author.
Mr. Cairns intends to give a theory of legal science. Normally, a reader who opens a book bearing this title would expect
to find in it set forth the epistemology and methodology of a
science which actually exists even if its theoretical foundations
should have remained hitherto unsatisfactory; one would expect
the author to point to the body of knowledge of which he purports to clarify the theoretical principles. In this respect the
reader will be disappointed. For Mr. Cairns is of the opinion that
legal science does not exist at all, if we except a few honorable
fragments, and that its creation is a task for the future. The
book contains, therefore, on the whole, the theory of a nonexistent science.
The science does not exist, but in the opinion of the author
it should exist. In order to aid it in coming into being, he undertakes the maieutic work of outlining its aims and its basic theoretical problems; and then he invites us to get busy on it. Some
readers may become irritated by the author's way of telling people what to do instead of doing it himself; but such irritation
would not be quite justified. There is certainly an exhortatory
tone running through the book which occasionally makes the
reader feel that the author might legitimate his theoretical undertaking somewhat by carrying out a few of the things which
* THE THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE, by Huntington Cairns, The University of
North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1941. Pp. vii, 155. $2.00.
t Professor of Government, University of Alabama, Visiting Professor of
Government (Spring Semester 1942), Louisiana State University.
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apparently he knows should be done. But there is more to the
work than just exhortation. The discussion has a positive value
because, in the review of past approaches, it reveals theoretical
fallacies and factual mistakes to be avoided in future; in addition
the author suggests what he believes to be the principal problem
of a legal science-and as we shall see, the problem suggested is
indeed the crucial problem of any science of social order. The
delimitation of a field of science through the formulation of its
central problem is certainly an important theoretical achievement; but the mere formulation leaves us completely in the dark
about the content of the future science. This situation makes the
book difficult reading. Its style is clear (with the exception of one
or two obscure passages) and the development of the problems is
lucid. But throughout the book the unfortunate reader is unable
to refer the ideas of the author to any fact of science, especially
because the author assures him at every turn that there is none
and that it will require patient work of generations of scholars to
produce the science. The reader is continuously floundering and
hesitating in his understanding because he is supposed not to
know what the author is talking about.
This, however, is only the predicament of the lay reader who
is willing to trust the author unconditionally. The expert in the
field will find another reason to be baffled. Mr. Cairns gives after
all some indications (very sparingly) of the scope and purpose of
the future legal science. Negatively, he makes it clear that legal
science is not legal history; that it cannot exhaust itself in the
mere accumulation of facts (no more descriptive institutionalism) but has to formulate general rules; that it is not identical
with analytical jurisprudence of the Austinian type; and that
current schools of legal theory such as sociological jurists, realists,
and experimentalists come under the title of "legal technology";
and that their results cannot be the basis of a science, important
as their work may be in other respects. Positively, he defines
legal science as the science of human behavior that has for its
function the elimination of disorder and the creation of order in
society.1 Legal science in this sense does not deal with the institutions of civil and criminal law only, but includes a large part at
least of the subject matter of political science.2 This rather large
field, which potentially might include all kinds of human behavior productive of order, is narrowed in later passages by the
1. P. 2.
2. P. 3.
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enumeration of six elements of legal structure which are to constitute the principal field of inquiry. The six elements are persons, associations, property, promises, the constitution of the community and the sustaining administrative system.8 For the sake
of abbreviating the classification the author shows a tendency to
bring the six elements under three headings: the regulation of
behavior (including the first four elements), the constitution, and
the administrative system.' The delimitation of the field to six
(or three) elements is further supplemented by the definition of
law as the means of social control "which, for its enforcement,
embodies in itself, or has behind it, a definite agency which exerts, or through which may be exerted, the pressure of politically
organized society."5 Mr. Cairns is aware that this definition is
oriented toward the modem state and that the inclusion of other
legal systems would have to take proper account of "equivalents"
to the enforcement machinery evolved by the modem state. The
ultimate aim of a science exploring this field will be the formulation of a system of general rules; but before rules of high generality can be formulated we have to prepare the way by the provisional construction of ideal types. "Ideal entities embodying the
orders of legal relations take us to the relevant in the enormous
varieties of social life and permit us to make comparisons which
may possibly lead to generalization and ultimately to knowledge,
universality and system."'
The program is laudable and I have no criticism to offer at
this stage; but, as I said, the expert reader will be baffled by it.
The project of a legal science as a social science dealing with human behavior oriented towards the problem of order in general,
as well as the classification of the three orders (regulation, administration, constitution), the definition of law by reference to
the enforcing agent, and above all the project of proceeding
through the construction of ideal types, are features familiar to
the reader because they are singly and in combination closely related to the sociological principles of Max Weber. The name of
Max Weber, appears in the monograph of Mr. Cairns only once in
a reference to his Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
(which is translated into English). That Max Weber is the creator of a system of sociology based on the construction of ideal
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.

93.
98.
22.
23.
111.
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types, that he has expounded the theoretical principles of the
science at considerable length in essays which have become classics of methodology, and that in 1922 his posthumous (fragmentary) treatise on Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft was published,
seems to be entirely unknown to Mr. Cairns. The treatise on
Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft is a quarto volume in small print that
would run in ordinary book-size into more than 2000 pages, half
of which are devoted to the execution of precisely the project
which is now suggested by Mr. Cairns. We are faced by the curiosity of a treatise trying to evolve from scratch, with considerable
labor, a theoretical position which was developed with great precision several decades ago in all its details and supplemented with
more than a thousand pages of rich material application. It would
be highly unfair, however, to assume that Mr. Cairns does not know
about Max Weber; on the contrary, he quotes one of his works.
Max Weber is, furthermore, known to every scholar in the field as
a towering giant in the social science of the last generation; his
work is available in every major library; and his fundamental
concepts have been submitted to an acute analysis by Professor
Talcott Parsons in his Structure of Social Action. The attitude of
Mr. Cairns is enigmatic and cannot be explained, perhaps, by
anyone but himself. Anyway, the reader who is interested in the
suggestions of Mr. Cairns is referred to the work of Max Weber
as the standard treatise on the "legal science" which, according to
Mr. Cairns, does not exist.
Some readers may consider the case closed once this point
has become clear. But again, the conclusion would be hasty. The
assumptions made by the author with regard to the state of legal
science are incorrect. Legal science, in his sense of the term, exists weightily (and not only in the work of Max Weber, as I may
add), and its theoretical problems are elaborated far beyond any
point reached by the author. We have to discount these facts in
dealing with the book under review. For Mr. Cairns is a philosophical personality in his own right, and what an original philosophical mind of his quality has to say deserves attention without
regard to the situation just outlined. Social science still has to
operate under handicaps; and the endeavors of the author, in their
successes and their failures, offer revealing insights into the theoretical situation of our time. If in the following critical evaluation
of the author's positions, the shortcomings seem to outweigh the
achievements, the reader should not be induced to underrate the
contribution of Mr. Cairns. To see the problems at all and to be
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concerned about them is the most important step in their treatment.
31

The first question that has to be clarified concerns the model
of science underlying the theoretical analysis. The question is of
particular importance in the context of the book because legal
science supposedly does not exist and the creation of its model is
the prelude to its future material elaboration. With regard to this
problem, Mr. Cairns seems to submit in a considerable degree to
the "superstition of science," that is, to the belief that the natural
sciences offer the model for the social sciences. The natural
sciences are the "more successful" sciences and we should do our
best to reach similar prosperity.8 The specific ideals held up in
pursuit of success are (1) the generality of laws,9 (2) the predictability of events on the basis of general laws,10 and (3) exactness.1
Let us take up the last point first. The author does not define
exactness, but from the context it appears that he opposes the
"more exact" sciences to the "less rigorous" studies. 12 This pair of
terms may be considered of doubtful value. If "exactness" has
any theoretical meaning at all, if applied to physics as the model
science, it can only mean that laws of physics are formulated
mathematically. The use, however, of the formal apparatus of
mathematics in the couching of propositions in any science, is not
a matter of choice but of ontological possibility. We operate with
mathematical symbols in the formulation of propositions concerning time-space-mass relations because we can apply them to relations in this realm of being. We do not apply mathematical symbols to the "anatomy of revolutions" or the "routinization of
charisma" because the structure of the subject matter does not
permit their application. The attempt to apply mathematical
methods to phenomena of the class just mentioned would not
make the propositions exact, but would result in nonsense. As
soon as we realize that the "inexactness" of the social sciences
simply means that the specific structure of subject matter requires other methods than the mathematical, the idea of keeping
up with the Joneses will lose its appeal; we shall realize that
8. P. II.
9. P. 7.
10. P. 10.
11. P. 139.
12. P. 139.
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"legal science" has its own standards of precision, though their
infinitely higher complexity makes it much more difficult to
maintain them or to reach an opinion, in the individual case, as to
whether they have been observed or not.
The second ideal of science, the formulation of general rules,
is-rather obscure. Mr. Cairns expresses it as follows: the object
of legal science must be "to ascertain if the complex reality of the
phenomena with which it is concerned exhibits elements of orderly recurrence which may be formulated in terms of generalizations or specific laws."'13 This ideal he opposes to the unsatisfactory state of a "mere accumulation of facts.' 1 4 In the light of
the third ideal, that of the predictability of consequences of social
actions,'5 the passage quoted seems to mean that general rules are
rules stating that the social phenomenon A whenever it occurs
will be followed regularly in time by the social phenomenon B.
But the intentions of the author are not quite clear on this point.
On other occasions he speaks of general laws "which unite a number of particular facts,""' or of "invariant relationships among the
facts,"' without any reference to a time sequence; these formulae
might apply as well to typical structural configurations. The unclearness of the formulae cannot be relieved by reference to specific instances of laws because the author, taking very seriously
his assumption that legal science does not exist, does not give
any. As the author leaves us groping in the dark he will not object, I hope, if we base our comments on a mere impression: We
have the feeling that his predominant model of generality is the
recurrence of time-sequences of social phenomena.
This postulate of general rules, if we have understood it correctly, obviously involves serious questions. It is formulated in
imitation of the structure of "natural sciences";18 the problem
arises, therefore, whether the subject matter of social order has
the same structure as the subject matter of inorganic nature. The
problem is slurred over by Mr. Cairns through his frequent use
of the term "external world" for both nature and society; but this
use involves a petitio principii: Whether there is an external
world with a uniform structure of subject matter is precisely the
point in question. The author himself has his qualms about the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
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omnipresence of general rules, but he assuages them by the sentence: "The ideal remains warranted in the absence of a demonstration-which is still to be offered-that its realization is impossible." 19 This is a neat trick of shoving the proof to the
opponent, but it does not hold water. The author, who so amply
quotes methodological literature, should know that a negative
proposition concerning facts cannot be proved according to the
rules of verifiability which he himself sets forth so ably in his
book.10 If he is waiting for a demonstration of the impossibility of
general rules in legal science, he will have a long time to wait
because it cannot be given.
The problem of the structure of social science lies elsewhere.
Mr. Cairns states rightly that the ideal of science "determines in
large part the subject matter to be selected for examination, the
methods to be adopted, even the facts which will be chosen for
study.' 21 In brief, the question of relevance and of the principle
of selection is the crucial question with regard to the structure of
social science. On the question of relevance the book, however, is
silent, except for its enumeration of topics which has previously
been noticed; and it is silent for the good reason that Mr. Cairns
has no overt philosophy of man and of his place in society and the
world at large that could tell him what is relevant in the world of
man and society; the whole branch of knowledge that goes today
under the name of philosophical anthropology is non-existent for
the author. Unless we have an idea of man, we have no frame
of reference for the designation of human phenomena as relevant
or irrelevant. Man is engaged in the creation of social order
physically, biologically, psychologically, intellectually and spiritually. Some of these engagements will offer the opportunity for
the formulation of fairly general rules; for example, a societal
order based on monastic ideals and on the postulate of celibacy
will die out within a generation unless it can recruit itself from
a surrounding society; or, no society is stable if the ruling class is
not the wealthiest class through personal property or through the
institutionalized chance of disposition over the wealth of the
country; or, a movement under charismatic leadership will become institutionalized or disintegrate rapidly. Other propositions
will apply to certain cultural areas only, as for instance, Calvinism is a contributing factor in the formation of rational working
19. P. 8.
20. P. 70.
21. P. 8.
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habits. And some propositions can hardly be called general at all
because there is only one case involved, as for instance, the idea
of the equality of men in the Western World is partly shaped by
Christianity.
Faced by the fact of social science as it appears from these
scanty examples, it seems somewhat futile to lay down the law
that legal science should be a body of rules of a certain type. Our
first concern is with the relevance of subject matter; if social
phenomena appear to us as relevant they will become the object
of scientific investigation, and we shall try to form ideal types of
structures, factors, time-sequences, et cetera, as the necessity
arises without bothering much about their degree of generality.
The town, for instance, as a form of ordered social life, may seem
relevant to us; and then we shall set about to construct the types
of Hellenic, oriental, Mesopotamian, medieval and modern occidental towns, and we shall not be deterred from such undertaking because the "ideal type" of the medieval town is not a "general rule" and has no chance of leading us to further general
rules. 22 Of course, Mr. Cairns might object that he is not interested in scientific propositions which do not lead, at least, to
general rules. Confronted by this argument we would have to
give up: Nobody is obliged to be interested in any particular
science or in science at all. If the author should not be interested
in social science as it exists, that would be his private affair; he
certainly would have no authority to declare the rather impressive results of social science as non-existent or unscientific because and insofar as they do not correspond to his idea of generality.. A proposition may be illegitimate in a system of social
science for one of two reasons: (1) because it is unverifiable, or
(2) because it is irrelevant in the system of reference that is
determined by philosophical anthropology; the question of generality has no bearing on the legitimacy of its status.
m

The last sentences seem to mark a limit of theoretical discussion-but the reader will have noticed the conditional. There
is no disagreement between Mr. Cairns and other social scientists
on the point that propositions have to be verifiable and that typeconstructions have to fit the facts. The point of potential disagreement appears in the theory of relevance. Obviously, we do
not all have the same idea of man and our principles of selection
22. P. IIi.
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of relevant subject matter may differ widely. The great systems
of social thought have different rules of relevance because they
have different anthropologies. The anthropology of Aristotle is
not that of Plato, the Machiavellian is not the Thomistic, the
Bodinian not the Hobbesian, and so forth; and the systems of
these thinkers are at variance with each other less because of disagreement about facts than because of disagreement about anthropological principles. If this is the theoretical situation, do we
have to accept the consequence that there never will be a social
science in steady progress to ever higher perfection of the system
like the natural sciences? Will social science be at the mercy of
any individual position with regard to metaphysical questions
about the nature of man? The answer is an emphatic Yes.
Let us reduce the first shock somewhat by the assurance that
the situation is not in danger of degenerating into chaotic subjectivism; above all, the weight of the social institutions surrounding us is a corrective to aberrations, insofar as the idea of
man embodied in them will influence the amplitude of the socially possible disagreement. The errors of philosophical anthropology within this established frame are, furthermore, permanently under corrective discussion; anyone who would build today a science of social order on the assumption that the creation
and content of social order are not influenced by the religious
consciousness of man and by his religious ideas, or on the assumption that economic problems are not a factor in political
order, or that certain elements of human nature which are studied by mass psychology can be neglected, will not find much admiration for his subjective achievement; he will be told politely
but firmly to get acquainted with the facts of life before he starts
talking about problems of social order. Through all disagreement
among philosophers, there is a convergence towards standards
which makes it impossible to claim the successful construction of
a system unless the anthropology underlying it gives due weight
to the various elements of human nature.
While there exists a certain stock of knowledge about man
which a scholar in the field of social science is not at liberty to
disregard grossly without exposing himself to the reproach of incompetence, there is no hope of steady improvement by concerted
efforts. For the idea of man is not a datum of the external world
but a creation of the human spirit, undergoing historical changes,
and it has to be recreated by every generation and by every single person. To mention the most decisive epoch of the idea: The
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appearance of Christ has added to the idea of man the dimension
of spiritual singularity of every human being, so that we can no
longer build a science of social order, for instance on the anthropologies of Plato or Aristotle. Likewise, within the Christian
Western World the idea of man is not static, but changes constantly; it has acquired, for instance, through and since the
Renaissance the dimension of historic singularity. The chief determinants of the various ideas are to be found in the fundamental religious attitudes of the thinkers who created and transformed them. The physical and social sciences differ, therefore,
profoundly in their epistemologies. The realm of matter is, in a
sense, static, and the progress we can make in its explorations is
the progress in the dissection of a corpse that holds still; the
realm of man and society is relatively much more alive and the
degree of understanding will be determined by the amplitude of
the idea of man which is at the disposition of a scholar through
environmental tradition and through the breadth of his personality. Consequently we have to be extremely cautious in attributing the deficiencies of an effort in the social sciences to plain lack
of knowledge (which, of course, also occurs quite frequently); if
there is any doubt we should rather attribute the selections and
omissions to the fundamental attitude of a scholar with regard to
the idea of man.
After this digression we can now return to the preferences of
Mr. Cairns. His idea of general rules is not just a private fancy;
and the discussion is not at an end. We have to deal now with
the ideas of man and society implied in the author's monograph.
In this analysis we have to tread very cautiously, because the discussion cannot be straightforward. Mr. Cairns does not develop
an idea of man explicitly and we have to infer his idea from the
implications of his statements. The most important step in its
understanding is done through the very recognition of the fact
that it is only implied. The nature of man does not become explicitly problematical because the author does not take his stand
in the realm of experiences which determine the religious and
historical singularity of the person. Mr. Cairns knows that there
is a problem of relevance, but he does not see that relevancies
change with the idea of man, and that this idea has its roots in
the sphere of self-reflective personality, in which the attitudes of
man toward the world are constituted. He assumes that there is
only one legitimate system of relevancies and that the problem,
therefore, needs no discussion. And he can make this assumption
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because man is for him a part of the external world, along with
other natural phenomena, seen from the outside. Whole sections
of the human person which have decisive functions in the constitution of social order do not enter, therefore, his field of observation. At this point it becomes difficult to decide whether some of
the surprising statements of Mr. Cairns should be excused as
being the expression of his peculiar idea of man, or whether a
more critical approach would be justified. I select a passage characteristic of his attitude towards religious phenomena. For instance, we find the sentence: "In the tradition of Christianity, a
knowledge of truth was a necessary element in salvation, but
knowledge which was not religious was heretical. '

2

The sentence

is supported, in a footnote, by the authority of Gibbon. May I suggest that the author read the Prooemium of Thomas Aquinas'
Contra Gentiles on the problem of duplex veritas; he will be surprised. And may I further remark that the idea of quoting Gibbon
as an authority on this problem is somewhat baroque. The reader
will do well also to note the past tense in which the author speaks
of Christianity. The realm of Christian experience has practically
lost its function in determining the relevant selection of materials;
and we shall see that it is not the only realm that has disappeared.
Man, thus, is reduced for the author to the level of an object
in the external world; man may be inventive, but he is not the
spiritually creative center of society and history; man has lost his
singularity and has become a fungible unit. The structure of society is assimilated to that of matter. The science of a social order
constituted by persons can produce general rules only with regard to phenomena which are determined by the fungible biological structure of man, or by other structural elements on the periphery of the spiritual core of the person; man has to be reduced
to the fungible structures in order to make a science of general
rules possible. A system of relevancies of this type will also satisfy the author's pragmatic desires. Mr. Cairns extends strictures
to contemporary legal theorists, as we have seen, because they are
occupied with a technology of law. But he does not condemn
technology as such. He only feels that detached investigation
will result in a system of rules which can be applied more successfully to the solution of social problems, than the insufficient
recipes of scholars who confine their attention too narrowly to
the immediate practical problems. A social science "aims to tell
us in advance the perils which attend our various programs; to
23. P. 131.
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24
tell us which is the rational and which the irrational course."
The managerial or engineering interest clearly predominates,
assuming blandly that we all know what we want, that we all
want the same, and that the problem of social order does not lie
precisely in the fact that our ideas of order differ in correspondence to our ideas of man.
Mr. Cairns does not overlook the problem entirely. He is
aware that people differ in their opinions about values and that
the most perfect system of technologically usable general rules
will not tell us what to do. His engineering attitude makes him
suggest a curious solution to the problem: If we can postulate a
science of general rules which does not exist, why not postulate a
science of ethical rules which does not exist? According to the
author we do not have complete knowledge of legal phenomena
unless we possess rules of evaluation in addition to the rules descriptive of behavior. Such a science of values "belongs altogether
to the future,2' 5 but that we shall achieve it in due course the
author has no doubt. If only we take up specific problems one by
one, the specific solutions will "drop of their own accord into a
system. '2 6 The older method, the medieval, of ordering our problems by referring them to a fundamental attitude of the person
toward life and the world as a whole is broken by the Renaissance.27 Any doubts concerning the new method of studying specific unrelated problems "were dispelled by the Industrial Revolu28
tion and the triumphs of the principle of the Division of Labor.
While this argument seems to have a narcotic effect on Mr. Cairns
and makes him see the future in rosy hues, it has the opposite
effect on the reader. For the reader may remember having heard
that an automobile engine is certainly a triumph of the Division
of Labor (capitalized as it befits a divinity), but that the specific
parts of the engine do not drop into place by magic, but because
they were made according to the specifications of the designer of
the final product. And he may be slightly disturbed by the
thought that division of labor without design has sometimes resulted in unpleasantness. If, for instance, we let everybody use
his abilities to his best and trust that from the division of labor
will emerge somehow a satisfactory order of mankind, we may
find to our dismay that the specific parts do not drop at all into

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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P.
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P.
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145.
145.
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their places in a smooth-running order, but that they clash in the
ghastly mess of a World War (capitalized to match the divinity of
the Division of Labor). I hope I do not have to elaborate the point
further in order to make it clear that the spiritual nihilism of Mr.
Cairns is pregnant with dangers.
If the nihilism of Mr. Cairns were simply a case of eighteenth
century mechanistic interpretation of man, we would not need to
bother about his book. But it is a distinctly modern spiritual
nihilism, reflecting the experiences of a philosophic mind. The
man of Mr. Cairns is irreligious, he is a-historic and, I have the
impression, he may be even a-political in the sense that he has no
will to establish a relationship of authority between himself and
other men. But he has a very clear ethical consciousness (though
Mr. Cairns does not disclose the content of his ethical code) and
he reveals an optimistic active desire to improve and stabilize
social conditions by "rational" social control. He is socially benevolent, but he is not a benevolent despot; he is a benevolent
democrat who dreams of an Huxleyan brave new world minus
the differentiation of men into Alphas, Betas and Gammas.
The intenseness of these sentiments has enabled Mr. Cairns
to formulate the central topic of a science of social order; and his
formulation stands as that of an important theoretical principle
in spite of the curious twist which it receives in the engineering
context. We have mentioned earlier the definition of "legal
science" as the science of human behavior that reacts against disorder. "The order which exists in human society at any given
time is predominantly an achieved order, an invention at the center of which is man; it is not the order of the physical universe,
which in physical theory is the product of the blind operation of
nature." The social theorist cannot take for granted "an ultimate
social order which it is his task to discover. He must assume an
ultimate disorder, which through the agency of man's inventiveness and other factors has been changed into order. ' 29 "Order in
social life is wrought from disorder" 0 by means of "creative imagination."8'
Here at last we tread on classical ground. By the experience
of social disorder human mind is provoked to create order by an
act of imagination in accordance with its ordering idea of man.
The disorder of the Athenian polis provoked Socrates to stimulate
29. P. 54.

30. P. 53.
31. P. 60.
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the imagination of his fellow citizens in the direction of true order. He died for his attempt and Plato created under the impression of this tragedy the great order of the Republic hoping to
catch the imagination of the people or at least of a ruler who
would impose it on the disordered people. His hope of creating
order in Hellas failed, but the Republic stands as the first theoretical system of social order in the Western World. Here we can
witness the origin of social science in the creative imagination of
the philosopher who wishes to overcome disorder. The will to
overcome disorder has remained the driving force of the great
systems, of the Christian of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and of
the later systems originating in the sphere of the national state,
until with Giambattista Vico the imaginative creative forces become themselves topical and are so to this day in the great body
of science concerned with the theory of social and political myths.
Where does Mr. Cairns stand in relation to his predecessors?
With regard to this question the reader will experience a great
surprise, for on page 53 he can read that "this approach was first
developed" in the year of our Lord 1932 in a paper in the Po2
litical Science Quarterly.
This is not an occasional remark but the considered opinion
of the author. He believes that "At the basis of social thought
today is the Holbachian view that man is the work of nature; he
exists in nature; he is submitted to her laws; he cannot deliver
himself from them. Three centuries of failure should teach us to
look in new directions."' 8 In the "new direction" we recognize
the fact that order is wrought from disorder.8 4 Christianity is not
the only realm of experience that has disappeared; Hellas is out,
too; and the theory of the origin of order in the creative myth
since Vico is swept aside. No reader could be blamed if he parted
company with the author and looked "in new directions." But the
phenomenon is too overwhelming and too fascinating to be met
by such action. There have always been men whose minds had
the peculiar bent which we may call for its most famous instance
the Cartesian. The world had to be wiped out and only when the
tabula was rasa could they make a new start of theorizing. The
grandeur of the Critique of Pure Reason is its opening as a monologue spinning a thread of thought out of the mind of the philos32. Well, Well! This should not cast, however, a reflection on the paper
which is quite good.
33. P. 52.
34. P. 53.
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opher without regard to anything that has preceded. The style
has its merits in philosophy, particularly in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, when the thinking Ego emerged as the
residue of the wreckage of medieval civilization and the new dimension of history had not yet been fully acquired. But Mr.
Cairns is neither a Descartes nor a Kant, but a theorist of "legal
science" with an eye on a controlled social order, and we do not
live any more in the eighteenth century. The tabula rasa attitude
is there, but it does not serve to clear a path for speculative action
of the res cogitans; it rather leaves us face to face with an unknown future for, as we have seen, Mr. Cairns does not replace
the past by his own present, but projects his idea of science into
a distant future.
The implications of this new attitude, which has been in the
making since the middle of the nineteenth century, can be made
clearer by reflection on a sentence from a speech of Mussolini to
his Blackshirts: "The past is behind us, the future is before us,
we stand in the present inbetween." Some may consider this
sentence an oratorical flourish; but they would be mistaken. Not
at all times are the past behind us and the future before us; that
happens only when we are in the throes of a violent crisis. Normally the past and the future are present; we do not stand between them, but are moving in the continuous stream of history.
The past reaches into our present as the civilizational heritage
that has formed us and that we have to absorb into our lives as
the precondition for the formation of the future, not in some distant time ahead of us, but in the present of our daily life and
work. Mr. Cairns stands on a hill-top, before and behind him
stretching a desert of nothingness; the past and the future have
shrunk back from his present into solid blocks of "non-existence,"
the category he uses most frequently. And is there any present
left, if past and future have receded? For what is human present,
but the creative absorption of the past for the purpose of transforming it into the future?
The question is pertinent for the theory of Mr. Cairns. For "in
the ordering of human relations, as in other spheres, creative
imagination is a necessary factor."' 5 The principle is valid, I
think, and its elaboration would have given occasion to unfold in
form of a system of wealth of materials and interpretations that
we possess, ranging from Plato's theory of the origin of order in
35. P. 60.
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the mythical forces of the soul to Maurice Hauriou's idde directrice as the core of governmental institutions and W. Y. Elliott's
theory of personal and institutional myths, et cetera. But again,
this whole branch of knowledge comes under the axe; it does not
exist. The topic of the creative forces is replaced by a chapter on
"The Inventive Process." The choice of vocabulary is characteristic; the term "creative imagination" which correctly indicates
the problem is used only occasionally, the main argument is concerned with "invention." "The order which we observe in society
is an invention of man." ' The terminology of invention diverts the
problem away from the creative forces of the soul and turns it towards purposive rational action. That "the products of social life,
which may be conveniently summed up in the label 'culture,' are
inventions,' 37 is not a new theory. Critias and Kallikles have expounded it at the height of Greek enlightenment when the mythical forces of Athens were dying and the city was ripe for the end.
The myth was lost; its problems dissolved into the psychology of
the inventive process and the psychology of the motives underlying specific cultural inventions. The heroic attempt of Plato to
create a new myth had to fail in this environment.
Mr. Cairns follows the same path. He actually devotes a section to the psychology of the "happy idea" and quotes Helmholtz
to the effect that his ideas came most readily "'during the slow
ascent of wooded hills on a sunny day.' "" Some people get their
best ideas when they are drunk, and others attain their most productive mood in even less conventional circumstances. It is a fascinating field-but I wonder whether such stories will help us
much in understanding the Declaration of Independence as the
basic myth of the order of the American Republic. Mr. Cairns
himself does not believe it; and the chapter on invention ends
with the inevitable insight that it has not got us anywhere.39 A
great opportunity, the opportunity of outlining, at least, the problem of the origin of social order in the creative powers of the person, is wasted.
IV

Mr. Cairns' book abounds in problems on which we have not
been able to touch in this review. The reader is particularly referred to the analyses of hypothesis and verification, of change,
36. P. 53.
37. P. 53.

38. P. 58.
39. P. 68.
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activity, relation, causality, equilibrium and the relation between
orders. These sections are, however, subordinated to the primary
purpose of developing the "model" of the future science. We hope
we have brought out the main trend of ideas and attitudes and
may now summarize the result.
We started with the "baffling" aspects of the book, with the
exhortatory cry for a science of social order which does not exist
and with the rejection as non-existent of the body of science,
which actually does exist. Then we tried to trace these peculiarities to their roots in the metaphysical attitude of the author. We
were careful not to deal with his selections and omissions on the
level of a critical discussion, which obviously would have been
impossible in the face of the author's assigning the status of nonexistence to the surrounding world of social science (of which the
present writer is an ever so humble part). The only occasions for
critical remarks were offered, therefore, in the instances in which
the author went beyond his verdicts of non-existence and made
factually incorrect statements about the subject matter at hand,
as in the case of his remarks about the relation of Christian philosophy to the problems of knowledge and truth. For the rest, we
preferred to interpret the author's judgments in the light of his
system of relevancies. His metaphysical attitude determining the
relevancies may be summed up as follows:
The Christian spirituality as well as the historical singularity
of the person is annihilated. As no other myth of order is given
as an unquestioned enveloping inheritance, man stands on a desert of nothingness without a past; and as the creative center is
lost, he carries no order within himself but has to stumble blindly
into the future. In the anxiety of his disorder, this man projects
his desire for order into the future, hoping that by some miracle
the unrelated pieces of the puzzle will fall into place and present
him with the order which he himself cannot create. The need for
shelter under an order and the inability to create it, find their
typical expression in seeking refuge in the order of natural
science, the only order that is left in our civilization once the spiritual orders are destroyed. The method of natural science will
deliver by some black magic the missing order in the form of
general rules which can be used in the administration of an ethical program that also will emerge by some magic out of a science
of values assembled through the unfailing planless Division of
Labor. And what is that whole order good for, once we have it?
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Nobody knows. It is an order without meaning, an order at any
cost born out of the anxieties of a lost man.
This picture of man and his order is frightening. If the men,
who by character, intellect and education should be the pillars of
continuity in our civilization, who should be the models of loyalty
to our past in order to have a firm grip on the future that is to be
shaped by their hands-if these men brush away the past and
"march into the future," what shall we expect of the common
people? Mr. Cairns' book may not be the ideal scientific treatise,
but it certainly is a touching personal document and it is a terrifying symptom of the disorder in which we live.
COMMENT
Professor Voegelin plainly has read my little book with care.
His criticisms do not call for extended comment on my part as I
believe the attentive reader will find them to be fully answered in
the book.
If American jurisprudence is a social science in the sense in
which sociology, economics, anthropology, political science, and
geography are social sciences, then I am not aware of it. Professor
Voegelin has not brought forward a single argument to negative
my contention. His chief complaint on this point, aside from matters of history, is that I have delimited a field of legal science, but
have not yet supplied the content. That is flattering and I can
only crave Professor Voegelin's patience. Inasmuch as Professor
Voegelin indicates no reason why such a procedure is methodologically unsound, and as there are successful historical precedents for it, I must assume that in that aspect at least my undertaking is warranted. As a matter of fact, I anticipated Professor
Voegelin's criticism, where, in discussing the possibility of a
social science jurisprudence I quoted, on page 3 of the book, Mr.
Russell's remark that the science of pure mathematics was baptized long before it was born. The invalidity of Professor Voegelin's criticism is immediately apparent if for my name in one
of Professor Voegelin's passages I substitute that of the father of
all jurisprudence, thus: "Plato was of the opinion that legal
science did not exist at all, and that its creation was a task for the
future. The Dialogues contain, therefore, on the whole, the theory
of a non-existent science." That is an accurate description of perhaps the most discussed theory of jurisprudence the world has
known.
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Professor Voegelin's remarks about Weber are astonishing.
From Plato to Kelsen there have been many efforts to construct
a pure science of law. I attempted no description of any of them.
My book was an effort at a methodology from the standpoint of
the limitations of American jurisprudence conceived as a social
science and was not historical; if it had been historical Professor
Voegelin would find that my admiration for Weber, while considerable, is somewhat less than his, particularly on the methodological side. It is true, as Professor Voegelin says, that Weber
thought about law in terms of order. But so also did Aristotle,
Aquinas, Kant and Ehrlich, as I state on pages 24-25 of the book.
Professor Voegelin was perhaps mislead by my brief discussion of
the theory of ideal types on which Weber in German sociological
circles appears to have secured a patent. It seems scarcely necessary to state that it has been a tool of scientific inquiry since the
days of ancient Greece. Weber's use of the notion is now a historical commonplace in sociology. That his formulation of the
theory needs extensive revision does not have to be argued.
Any further discussion on my part would be a matter of
analyzing Professor Voegelin's ontology and stating the case
against some of his other assertions from the standpoint of scientific methodology. I have no inclination to discuss the ontology
which appears to me to add nothing to the validity of the methodological principles of legal science. For the rest I am fully content
to permit the book to speak for itself on the constructions Professor Voegelin has placed upon the theory there proposed.
HUNTINGTON CAIRNS

